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Discovery in Rule 32 Proceedings
941 So.2d 327
STATE v. STALLWORTH
STATE v. STALLWORTH
941 So.2d 327 (AL 2006)
Ex parte State of Alabama.
(In re STATE of Alabama
v.
Calvin STALLWORTH).
CR-05-0703.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
April 28, 2006
328
This Page Contains Headnotes.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Baldwin County, Nos.
CC-98-0112.60 and CC-98-0113.60, James H. Reid, Jr.
329
Troy King, atty. gen., and Corey L. Maze, asst. atty. gen., for
petitioner.
William L. Pfeifer, Jr., Foley; and Mark A. Flessner, Chicago,
Illinois, for respondent.
Gregory O. Griffin, Sr., chief counsel, and Dana L. Pittman,
asst. atty. gen., Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, for
amicus curiae Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, in support
of the petitioner.
J. David Whetstone, district atty., and Matt Green, asst.
district atty., Baldwin County District Attorney's Office, for
amicus curiae Baldwin County District Attorney's Office, in
support of the petitioner.
PER CURIAM.
The State of Alabama filed this petition
for a writ of mandamus directing Judge James H. Reid, Jr., to
vacate his discovery order related to Calvin Stallworth's
petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32,
Ala.R.Crim.P., in which he attacks his capital-murder
conviction and death sentence.
In 1998, Stallworth was convicted of two
counts of capital murder and was sentenced to death. On direct
appeal, we affirmed Stallworth's convictions and remanded the
case for the circuit court to correct its sentencing order. See
Stallworth v. State,868 So.2d 1128 (Ala.Crim. App.2001). On
return to second remand, we affirmed Stallworth's death
sentence. The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review.
Ex parte Stallworth,868 So.2d 1189 (Ala.2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1057, 124 S.Ct. 828, 157 L.Ed.2d 711 (2003). This
Court issued the certificate of judgment on June 27, 2003.
In June 2004, Stallworth filed a Rule 32
petition in the Baldwin Circuit Court attacking his
capital-murder convictions and death sentence. In May 2005,
Stallworth filed a lengthy discovery motion. In June
330
2005, Judge James H. Reid, Jr., held a hearing and delayed
ruling on the motion. Stallworth then filed an amended Rule 32
petition and a motion to renew the discovery motion that had
been filed in May 2005. On January 12, 2006, Judge Reid granted
Stallworth all of the discovery that he had requested in his
May 2005 discovery motion. The State then filed this mandamus
petition and a request that we stay all action pending the
disposition of this extraordinary petition. By order dated
January 20, 2006, we stayed all action in the circuit court and
allowed the respondents 21 days to answer the allegations
contained in this mandamus petition. Stallworth filed a
response. Additionally, amici curiae briefs were filed by the
Baldwin County District Attorney and the Alabama Board of
Pardons and Paroles.
Initially, we note that this case is
correctly before this Court by way of a petition for a writ of
mandamus. See Ex parte Land,775 So.2d 847 (Ala.2000); Hooks v.
State,822 So.2d 476, 478 (Ala. Crim.App.2000) (Alabama
appellate courts have used mandamus to review a circuit court's
ruling on a discovery motion). Moreover, this petition was
filed within the presumptively reasonable time period set out
in Rule 21(a), Ala.R.App.P. The Alabama Supreme Court in Ex
parte Thomas,828 So.2d 952 (Ala.2001), held that the State must
file a mandamus petition within seven days of the date of the
ruling that is the subject of the petition. The State filed
this petition within that period.
The State asserts that Judge Reid erred in
granting what it says is a broad discovery motion without first
determining whether good cause existed for disclosing the
requested information. Specifically, it argues that Judge Reid
failed to consider the claims for which the discovery was
requested.
Judge Reid's discovery order states, in
part:
"This cause having come before this Court upon [Stallworth's]
renewed motion for discovery of prosecution files, evidence,
institutional records, and information necessary to a fair Rule
32 evidentiary hearing, and the Court being of the opinion that
said motion is due to be granted, it is therefore
"Ordered that the State disclose to [Stallworth's] counsel to
inspect, copy, test, analyze, and photograph all materials
identified in petitioner's specific requests for discovery
within 30 days from the signing of this order. [Stallworth]
shall be granted a reasonable period of time to review,
investigate, analyze, test, and otherwise examine said
discovery, and is granted leave to amend the Rule 32 petition
within a reasonable time period thereafter."
In Land, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted
a standard of good cause for discovery in postconviction
proceedings initiated under Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P.(fn1) It
chose not to adopt the broader discovery rules for civil cases
contained in the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. As this
Court stated in Ex parte Perkins,920 So.2d 599
(Ala.Crim.App.2005):
"The Alabama Supreme Court in Land held that in order for a
petitioner to be entitled to discovery in a postconviction
331
proceeding the petitioner must show `good cause' for the
requested evidence. The Supreme Court stated: `[I]n order to
obtain discovery, a petitioner must allege facts that, if
proved, would entitle him to relief.' 775 So.2d at 852.
"In Ex parte Mack, [894 So.2d 764 (Ala.Crim.App.2003),] we
cited several cases that the Supreme Court relied on in Land
and stated the following concerning the `good cause'
standard:
"`"A trial court has inherent discretionary authority to order
discovery in post-conviction proceedings. See People ex rel.
Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill.2d 175, 183, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526
N.E.2d 131 (1988); People v. Rose, 48 Ill.2d 300, 302, 268
N.E.2d 700 (1971). A court must exercise this authority with
caution, however, because a defendant may attempt to divert
attention away from constitutional issues which escaped earlier
review by requesting discovery. . . . Accordingly, the trial
court should allow discovery only if the defendant has shown
"good cause," considering the issues presented in the petition,
the scope of the requested discovery, the length of time
between the conviction and the post-conviction proceeding, the
burden of discovery on the State and on any witnesses, and the
availability of the evidence through other sources. Daley, 123
Ill.2d at 183-84, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526 N.E.2d 131; see People
v. Fair, 193 Ill.2d 256, 264-65, 250 Ill.Dec. 284, 738 N.E.2d
500 (2000). We will reverse a trial court's denial of a
post-conviction discovery request only for an abuse of
discretion. Fair, 193 Ill.2d at 265, 250 Ill. Dec. 284, 738
N.E.2d 500. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in
denying a discovery request which ranges beyond the limited
scope of a post-conviction proceeding and amounts to a `fishing
expedition.'"'
"894 So.2d at 768 (quoting People v. Johnson, 205 Ill.2d 381,
408, 275 Ill.Dec. 820, 836-37, 793 N.E.2d 591, 607-08
(2002))."
920 So.2d at 602-03. The Alabama Supreme
Court in Land noted that the main emphasis in determining
whether good cause is shown is a determination of the merits
and the procedural posture of the underlying claims for which
the discovery is sought to substantiate. The Alabama Supreme
Court in Land stated:
"[W]e must determine whether Land presented the trial court
with good cause for ordering the requested discovery. To do
that, we must examine Land's basis for the relief requested in
his postconviction petition and determine whether his claims
are facially meritorious. Only after making that examination
and determination can we determine whether Land has shown good
cause."
775 So.2d at 853. In Hooks, we stated:
"[A] claim that is procedurally barred . . . in a
postconviction petition clearly is not one that entitles a
petitioner to relief. If a postconviction claim does not
entitle the petitioner to relief, then the petitioner has
failed to establish good cause for the discovery of materials
related to that claim. See Land."
822 So.2d at 481.
I.
The State initially asserts that it does
not contest Stallworth's request for access to the prosecutor's
case file related to the homicides. In Ex parte Perkins, supra,
we stated that a Rule 32 petitioner was entitled to inspect the
prosecutor's file. However, we also noted that there is no
right to inspect the State's work product.
332
In footnote 5 of its mandamus petition, the State contends:
"[T]he undersigned counsel and Stallworth's attorneys have
discussed . . . a mutually agreeable procedure for turning over
a copy of the prosecutor's file." (State's petition at page 12,
n. 5.) It thus appears that both parties have reached an
agreement on this requested discovery.
II.
The State contends that Stallworth failed
to show good cause for disclosure of "information relating to
food, water, medicine, or any other materials ingested or not
ingested by Stallworth and given to him during his
interrogation."
In the discovery motion Stallworth alleged
that this information was relevant to his claim that his
statements were coerced. Specifically, Stallworth stated:
"Stallworth alleges that employees of the Foley Police
Department, employees of the Baldwin County Sheriff's Office at
Robertsdale, Alabama, and perhaps other Alabama or federal law
enforcement offices coerced his confession in violation of his
constitutional rights. Stallworth alleges that he was not given
a timely Miranda warning before he was interrogated on the
major facts relating to these crimes. Stallworth also alleges
that he requested the assistance of an attorney and despite his
request, those state and/or federal employees and
representatives interrogating him refused to provide him with
an attorney or other meaningful legal assistance and refused to
cease questioning him after he requested an attorney.
Stallworth's interrogation lasted over a number of days, during
which he was not given adequate food or water, which seriously
impaired his ability to respond to this interrogation,
especially in view of his physical infirmities, including
diabetes and other physical problems. In addition, Stallworth
did not have the mental capacity to resist this kind of
physical pressure in the absence of the assistance of an
experienced attorney. As a result of Stallworth's improper
interrogation, which included threats and other mental and
physical compulsion, Stallworth involuntarily provided an
incriminating statement or statements which were false."
Stallworth's amended petition does not
raise a claim that Stallworth's statements were coerced.(fn2)
Accordingly, Stallworth cannot show good cause for the
disclosure of information related to this claim. There can be
no showing of good cause when the requested discovery does not
relate to any claim raised in a postconviction petition. See
Land, supra.
Moreover, the State contends that this
claim is procedurally barred in a postconviction proceeding and
that a procedurally barred claim does not entitle a petitioner
to relief; therefore, there can be no showing of good cause. We
agree. See Hooks, supra.
III.
The State further asserts that the circuit
court erred in allowing the following discovery:
"All documents or information relating to the mental health of
Stallworth, including, but not limited to:
333
"(a) All documents relating to any testing, examinations,
evaluations or interviews of Stallworth, including but not
limited to, psychiatric, psychological, neuro-psychological,
neurological or medical documents;
"(b) All records generated or maintained by the Alabama
Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation relating to
Stallworth;
"(c) All medical, psychological, psychiatric, educational or
mental health facility records of any kind, as well as any
records generated or maintained by any physician, psychologist,
psychiatrist, educator, medical or mental health provider of
any kind relating to Stallworth;
"(d) All records pertaining to Stallworth generated or
maintained by the Alabama Department of Human Resources,
including any sub-agency or department that operates within or
in conjunction with the Alabama Department of Human Resources;
and
"(e) All records of any proceeding from the juvenile docket of
the respective courts involving Stallworth.
"All documents or information relating to the incarceration of
Stallworth, including, but not limited to:
"(a) All records relating to Stallworth generated or maintained
by the Alabama Department of Corrections, including, but not
limited to, disciplinary records, medical records,
psychological, psychiatric, and mental health records, and any
other records generated or maintained by any prison, medical
facility or any other entity associated with the Alabama
Department of Corrections, including, but not limited to,
Baldwin County Jail and Holman State Prison;
"(b) All documents generated or maintained by the Alabama Board
of Pardons and Paroles relating to Stallworth;
"(c) All juvenile detention, jail, prison, parole, probation,
and pre-sentence investigation documents;
"(d) All records of detention or court authority; and
"(e) All institutional documents of any kind, including, but
not limited to, documents prepared by State facilities,
institutions, agencies, or educational entities, or any
facilities, institutions, agencies, or educational entities of
the State of Alabama in the possession, custody, or control of
the State, regardless of who originally made or kept them."
(Emphasis added.) The circuit court
ordered discovery from the Department of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation ("DMHMR"); the Department of Human Resources
("DHR"); the Alabama Department of Corrections ("DOC"); the
Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Board"); all Alabama
juvenile courts and detention centers, and various other
agencies.
The State asserts that Stallworth failed
to establish good cause for the disclosure of this information
because in the discovery motion Stallworth asserted that this
information was relevant to support his claim made pursuant to
Atkins v. Virginia,536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d
335 (2002) - a claim that Stallworth did not pursue in his
amended Rule 32 petition.
However, Stallworth asserts, and we agree,
that these documents were relevant to his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. See Land, supra, and
Perkins, supra.
The Board has filed an amicus curiae brief
in this case. It asserts that according to the Alabama Supreme
Court and this Court, the Board's files are confidential
334
and not subject to inspection. It cites the Alabama Supreme
Court's opinion in Ex parte Alabama Board of Pardons &
Paroles,814 So.2d 870 (Ala.2001), and this Court's opinion in
Jackson v. State,910 So.2d 797 (Ala.Crim.App.2005), to support
its assertion. (See subsection (b) in Stallworth's discovery
motion emphasized above.)
In Ex parte Alabama Board of Pardons &
Paroles, the Alabama Supreme Court stated: "Section
15-22-36(b), Ala.Code 1975, clearly and unambiguously
establishes an absolute privilege that the Board is legally
bound to obey and the circuit court is under a duty to uphold."
814 So.2d at 873. In Jackson, this Court stated: "[T]he circuit
court's order, which allows access to the Board's files,
directs the Board to violate § 15-22-36(b), Ala.Code 1975. The
records maintained by the Board are not subject to inspection."
910 So.2d at 809. Clearly, based on established precedent the
circuit court's order directing the Board to turn over its
records directed the Board to violate § 15-22-36(b), Ala.Code
1975.
IV.
The State further asserts that the circuit
court erred in granting the following discovery:
"All documents and information relating to the alleged crimes
and crime scenes, including, but not limited to:
"(a) All telephone records for December 4, 1997, for the Dukes
Parkway Shell [gasoline-service station] and any mobile phone
records belonging to or in the possession of Mrs. Dukes;
"(b) All telephone records for December 14, 1997, the telephone
records of the Diamond Station and any mobile phone belonging
to or in the possession of Mrs. Morton;
". . . .
"(i) The names and addresses of all persons with knowledge of
any fact or circumstance relating to the alleged crimes;
and
". . . .
"All documents and information disclosing bias, prejudice or
prejudgment by the citizens of Baldwin County, Alabama v.
Stallworth, including, but not limited to, letters, records of
telephone calls, memoranda, and any other records and including
documents reflecting the identify of persons expressing such
views."
(Emphasis added.)
The State asserts that Stallworth cannot
show good cause for the disclosure of this information because
Stallworth asserted that this evidence was relevant to his
Brady v. Maryland,373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215
(1963), claim, his juror-misconduct claim, and his claim that
he was innocent and that in the amended petition Stallworth
does not pursue his claim of innocence. Also, the State argues,
Stallworth failed to allege in his Brady claim and his
juror-misconduct claim any facts that would satisfy the
requirements of Ex parte Pierce,851 So.2d 606 (Ala.2000), or Ex
parte Dobyne,805 So.2d 763 (Ala.2001), because he failed to
allege that these claims could not have been raised at trial or
on direct appeal. See Boyd v. State,913 So.2d 1113 (Ala.
Crim.App.2003). We agree with the State; there can be no
showing of good cause when the requested documents relate to a
claim not raised in a postconviction petition or a claim raised
in a postconviction petition that is procedurally barred. See
Land, supra, and Hooks, supra.
In regard to the last emphasized portion
of Stallworth's discovery motion quoted above, Stallworth
requested "all
335
documents and information disclosing bias, prejudice or
prejudgment by the citizens of Baldwin County, Alabama versus
Stallworth." We are at a loss as to how this request could
possibly be complied with. Clearly, this discovery request
could only be characterized as a "fishing expedition."
V.
The State further argues that the
following discovery, related to the 47 State witnesses who
testified at Stallworth's trial, should not have been
allowed:
"All documents relating to any prosecution witness, that is or
may be favorable to Stallworth on the issue of guilt or
mitigation regarding any element of the offense of capital
murder, or felony murder, in the alleged crime, including but
not limited to:
"(a) All documents and information provided by prosecution
witnesses including, but not limited to, any communications or
statements (whether written or oral) from any source,
memoranda, summaries or recordings of such communications or
statements, and grand jury testimony;
"(b) All documents and information that may have impeached or
otherwise contradicted the testimony of any prosecution
witnesses;
"(c) As of the time of Stallworth's trial, and as of the
present, the curriculum vitae of any expert who testified at
Stallworth's trial, including, but not limited to Dr. Julia
Gooden, Richard Dale Carter and Dr. James C.U.
Downs;[(fn3)]
"(d) All juvenile detention, jail, prison, parole, probation,
and pre-sentence investigation recordings regarding any
Prosecution Witnesses;
"(e) All arrest, conviction, and adult and juvenile criminal
arrest and prosecution records regarding any Prosecution
Witness;
"(f) All records of any law enforcement authority, including
any documents relating to any plea negotiations between any
Prosecution Witness and the State;
"(g) All documents and information relating to or any reward
offered relating to the deaths of the Victims;
"(h) All documents relating to communications between the
Baldwin County District Attorney, the Office of Alabama's
Governor, the State and any Prosecution Witness or other
individual regarding the availability, promise or payment of a
reward;
"(i) All documents relating to the availability, promise or
payment of any reward;
"(j) All records of any detention or court authority relating
to any Prosecution Witness;
"(k) All records of any prosecuting authority relating to any
Prosecution Witness;
"(l) All psychiatric, psychological, educational, and mental
health records of any Prosecution Witness; and
"(m) All documents relating to any lie detector, or polygraph,
test taken by any Prosecution Witness, including the results,
whether or not conclusive."
In essence Stallworth requested all
juvenile, criminal, and mental-health records
336
related to the 47 State witnesses. In condemning such broad and
unfettered discovery, this Court in Jackson stated:
"The State also argues that Judge McCooey erred in allowing
discovery of all criminal, mental-health, and correctional
records for all witnesses who testified for the State at
Jackson's trial.
". . . .
"Jackson contends that these documents related to his Brady
claim - a claim Judge McCooey had previously found was
procedurally barred. When requested documents relate to a claim
that is procedurally barred there can be no showing of good
cause for the disclosure of the requested information. See
Hooks.
"Moreover, a defendant is not entitled to discover the criminal
records of a State witness. As this Court stated in Hardy v.
State,804 So.2d 247 (Ala.Crim. App.1999):
"`As a general rule, the government need not disclose evidence
available to the defense from other sources or evidence that
the prosecution could not reasonably be imputed to have
knowledge of or control over. Mills v. Singletary,63 F.3d 999
(11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1214, 116 S.Ct. 1837,
134 L.Ed.2d 940 (1996); United States v. Moore,25 F.3d 563 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 939, 115 S.Ct. 341, 130 L.Ed.2d
297 (1994).
"`We have held in Alabama in a number of cases that a defendant
is not entitled to the general disclosure of the criminal
records of the state's witnesses. See, e.g., Davis v. State,554
So.2d 1094 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd, 554 So.2d 1111
(Ala.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1127, 111 S.Ct. 1091, 112
L.Ed.2d 1196 (1991); Wright v. State,424 So.2d 684
(Ala.Crim.App. 1982) (no absolute right of disclosure of
criminal records of state's witnesses); Mardis v. State,423
So.2d 331 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Mack v. State,375 So.2d 476
(Ala.Crim.App. 1978), aff'd, 375 So.2d 504 (Ala.1979), vacated
on other grounds, 448 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 3044, 65 L.Ed.2d 1134
(1980). We have also held that the trial court's refusal to
order the prosecution, pursuant to a defendant's discovery
motion, to provide the criminal record of each expected witness
for the state was not a violation of Brady and its progeny.
Davis v. State, 554 So.2d at 1100.'
"804 So.2d at 286.
"Also, Jackson requested and was granted unlimited access to
the confidential mental-health records of all 20 witnesses for
the State. Allowing unfettered access to this information was
contrary to the decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex
parte Western Mental Health Center,884 So.2d 835 (Ala.2003),
and Ex parte Rudder,507 So.2d 411 (Ala.1987). . . .
"Last, the circuit court's ruling erroneously granted Jackson
unlimited access to juvenile records related to all 20
witnesses for the State. Discovery of information regarding
juveniles is severely limited by § 12-15-100, Ala.Code 1975. A
defendant is not entitled to unfettered access of privileged
documents. In Schaefer v. State,676 So.2d 947
(Ala.Crim.App.1995), this Court held that the defendant was
entitled to have the trial court examine in camera privileged
records, i.e., the child victim's psychiatric records and
records relating to the child kept by DHR, so that the court
could determine whether the privilege yielded to the
defendant's rights of confrontation and cross-examination. See
also D.P. v. State,850 So.2d 370 (Ala. Crim.App.2002). Here,
the trial court
337
conducted no in camera examination of the privileged
documents."
910 So.2d at 804-07 (footnote omitted).
While we realize that Stallworth may be entitled to some of the
requested information, Stallworth is not entitled to the broad
and unfettered discovery granted in regard to this discovery
request. See Jackson, supra.
VI.
The State further argues that Stallworth
failed to show good cause for disclosure of the following
documents:
"All documents or information relating to any involvement, or
suspected involvement, of any individual other than Stallworth
in the alleged crimes, including, but not limited to Gregory
Rolling, Danny Eugene May, Ralph McMillian, Eric Busey, Walter
Reed, Alfred James, Terrell James, Sherman Packer, Marvin C.
Dupree, Mack Arthur Adams, Charles Gregory Clark, Alex
Stallworth, or any other suspects, including but not limited
to:
"(a) All documents and information provided by, or relating to,
any of the aforementioned individuals, or any other
suspects;
"(b) The Baldwin County District Attorney's entire case files
relating to any of the aforementioned individuals, or any other
suspects;
"(c) All records of any proceeding relating to any of the
aforementioned individuals, or any other suspects;
"(d) All documents and information regarding the existence and
outcome of any plea or other negotiations between (a) the State
and (b) any other aforementioned individuals, or any other
suspects;
"(f) All arrest, conviction, and criminal offense records,
regardless of location of the events underlying such records,
regarding any of the aforementioned individuals, or any other
suspects;
"(g) All records relating to inmate placement at the Baldwin
County Jail, including but not limited to, records relating to
cell assignments for Stallworth, any of the aforementioned
individuals, or any other suspects."
Initially, we observe that Stallworth
never identified any of the individuals named in the discovery
motion. Also, Stallworth alleged in the discovery motion that
this information related to his Brady claim. As previously
stated, Stallworth's Brady claim is procedurally barred because
in the amended Rule 32 petition he failed to allege why that
claim had not been raised at trial or on direct appeal. See
Boyd, supra.
VII.
The State also asserts that discovery was
erroneously granted on the following documents:
"All documents or information relating to robberies or murders
in, or around, Foley, Alabama, and Mobile, Alabama, from 1995
to present, including, but not limited to, all documents
relating to any suspected correlation with the Alleged Crimes;
and
"(a) All documents or information relating to the
robbery/murder of William Fuller `Manzy' Ewing at a
gasoline/convenience store located on Fort Morgan Road, Baldwin
County, Alabama, on or about February 14, 1998 including, but
not limited to, all documents relating to any suspected
correlation between that incident and the Alleged Crimes,
and
"i. All latent fingerprints; fingerprint cards and documents
related thereto;
338
"ii. All documents written by, submitted to, or requested by
Alabama Department of Forensic Science employees;
"iii. All blood samples and documents relating to blood typing
or DNA testing;
"iv. All Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences receipts;
and
"v. All physical evidence."
Stallworth requested and was granted
access to every case file related to a murder or a robbery that
occurred in the Foley or Mobile area since 1995. The
consequences of granting such broad discovery are considerable
in terms of the district attorney's personnel and financial
resources. Indeed, we are aware of no other case involving such
a far-reaching discovery request.
The Baldwin County District Attorney has
filed an amicus curiae brief in which it argues that the
circuit court failed to consider the district attorney's
inability to comply with such broad discovery requests within
the allotted 30 days. It cites this Court's opinion in Jackson,
in which we specifically stated that a circuit court must
consider the following when determining whether to order
discovery in a collateral proceedings: (1) the issues raised in
the collateral petition; (2) the scope of the requested
discovery; (3) the length of time between the conviction and
the collateral proceeding; (4) the burden of discovery on the
State and on any witnesses; and (5) the availability of the
evidence through other sources. Jackson, 910 So.2d at 802,
quoting Land-People v. Johnson, 205 Ill.2d 381, 408, 275
Ill.Dec. 820, 836-37, 793 N.Ed.2d 591, 607-08.
We agree with the Baldwin County District
Attorney that there is no indication that the circuit court
considered the time, manpower, and expense that the State was
required to exert to comply with the enormous discovery order
in this case.
Moreover, Stallworth asserted in his
discovery motion that this information was relevant to his
Brady claim. As we have previously stated, a Brady claim is
barred if it fails to assert why the claim was not raised at
trial or on direct appeal.
VIII.
The State further asserts that Stallworth
failed to show good cause for disclosing the following physical
evidence:
"All documents and information regarding evidence of the
alleged crimes, including, but not limited to:
"(a) All forensic materials and physical evidence relating to
the alleged crimes, including, but not limited to, items
handled by agents of the Baldwin County (Alabama) Sheriff's
Office, the Foley Police Department, the Baldwin County
Coroner's Office, and the Alabama Bureau of Investigation and
the following items:
"(i) Purses, television sets, telephones, safes, cash
registers, papers, space heaters and jewelry;
"(ii) oral, anal and vaginal swabs;
"(iii) hair, fingernail clippings and trace fibers;
"(iv) knives;
"(vi) clothing, including but not limited to, [Stallworth's]
hooded jacket, and the victims' clothing
"(vii) bloody towels and rags;
"(viii) Other blood or bodily fluid samples or residue; and
"(ix) DNA samples, such as two patches cut from the inside
sleeve of [Stallworth's] dark hooded jacket.
"(b) All documents and information provided by or submitted to
the Baldwin County Coroner's office, including, but not limited
to, any reports by Huey Mack relating to the victims and
339
the victims' death certificates, respectively;
"(c) All documents or information relating to all
criminalistic, laboratory, forensic or scientific examination,
investigation or analysis of any object, sample, exhibit,
material, or fluid in relation to the alleged crimes,
including, but not limited to, fingerprint and DNA
examinations.
"(d) All Documents or information relating to any condition of
either victim from the time their bodies were found to the
conclusion of their autopsies;
"(e) All documents or information on the chain of custody and
conditions, or changes therein, of any exhibit used at trial,
from the time it was taken into custody by the State until the
time of Stallworth's trial;
"(f) All documents relating to the Victims' injuries,
including, but not limited to, documents relating to the
autopsies performed and diagrams related thereto;
"(g) All documents relating to time of death
determinations;
"(h) All blood samples and documents relating to blood typing
or DNA testing;
"(i) All documents relating to tests of any kind conducted on
Stallworth, including, but not limited to, documents relating
to all tests conducted on samples of Stallworth's hair, blood,
saliva or any other corporeal sample;
"(j) All documents relating to any analysis, comparison or
evaluation of any suspects' fingerprints, hair, blood or other
corporeal samples in relation to the alleged crimes;
"(k) All documents relating to or constituting fingerprints
including, but not limited to, all latent fingerprints,
fingerprint evaluations and comparisons;
"(l) All documents relating to any medical, pathological,
toxicological, biochemical, criminalistic, laboratory, forensic
or scientific examination, investigation, or analysis relating
to the deaths of the victims, including, but not limited to,
vitreous fluid readings, nail clippings, fingernail scrapings,
DNA samples, including those patches taken from the inside
sleeve of [Stallworth's] jacket, hair fibers, swabs, and any
other forensic evidence tested and/or analyzed; and
"(m) All documents relating to time of death determinations in
the alleged crimes, including, but not limited to, time of
death calculations and charts relating thereto."(fn4)
Stallworth asserted in his discovery
motion that this information was relevant to his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel because, he argued: "To
determine whether his trial counsel was ineffective, Stallworth
must examine all of the physical and DNA evidence that was
available during his trial." He further asserted in his
discovery motion:
"Stallworth may further argue that his trial counsel were
ineffective in that they failed to retain a blood splatter
expert to examine Stallworth's dark hooded jacket, as well as
the small residue of blood inside the sleeve of the same
jacket; crime scene photographs and other related evidence.
Stallworth's trial counsel even failed to argue whether the
blood splatter evidence set forth
340
during trial was consistent with the evidence allegedly linking
Stallworth to these murders."
Based on Stallworth's own statements this
information was not relevant to any claim that was raised but
was requested so that counsel could investigate into possible
new claims. This information was sought so that counsel could
go on a fishing expedition. As the Alabama Supreme Court warned
in Land:
"[W]e caution that postconviction discovery does not provide a
petitioner with a right to `fish' through official files and
that it `is not a device for investigating possible claims, but
a means of vindicating actual claims.' . . . Instead, in order
to obtain discovery, a petitioner must allege facts that, if
proved, would entitle him to relief."
775 So.2d at 852. Such discovery is not
sanctioned by the Alabama Supreme Court in postconviction
proceedings.
As the Illinois Supreme Court stated when
reviewing a similar discovery request:
"During the post-conviction proceedings below, defendant
requested that he be permitted discovery in order to analyze
the following items: fingerprint evidence collected by the
State from the Adams crime scene; the blood-like substance
found in his truck; and the four $100 bills found in his truck.
Defendant asserts that, if permitted discovery of these items,
he may be able to place other possible suspects at the Adams
crime scene, show that the blood-like substance in his truck
did not belong to the victim, Adams, and, finally, show that
the four $100 bills were proceeds from his bank loan. The
circuit court denied all these requests. Defendant alleges
reversible error in the circuit court's denial.
"The circuit court has inherent discretionary authority to
order discovery in post-conviction proceedings. People ex rel.
Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill.2d 175, 183, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526
N.E.2d 131 (1988). Circuit courts should exercise this inherent
authority with caution, however, because post-conviction
proceedings afford only limited review and `because there would
exist in those proceedings a potential for abuse of the
discovery process.' Daley, 123 Ill.2d at 183, 121 Ill.Dec. 937,
526 N.E.2d 131.
"The circuit court correctly denied the discovery requests. The
requests amount to a fishing expedition in an attempt to create
some doubt of defendant's guilt. Post-conviction proceedings
are limited to providing a forum for the litigation of
constitutional claims that were not presented in the original
proceedings. Daley, 123 Ill.2d at 182, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526
N.E.2d 131. Defendant's discovery requests go beyond this
limited scope and, as a result, were properly denied."
People v. Olinger, 176 Ill.2d 326, 370-71,
223 Ill.Dec. 588, 610, 680 N.Ed.2d 321, 342-343 (1997).
IX.
Last, the State asserts that Stallworth
failed to show good cause for disclosing the following:
"All documents or information relating to Chief Investigator
Jimmie or James Flanagan of the Foley Alabama Police
Department; Warren Stewart of the Alabama Bureau of
Investigation, and Deputy Sheriff James Stallworth of the
Baldwin County, Alabama Sheriff's Department, including, but
not limited to:
"(a) Their employment files regarding their employment;
341
"(b) Any and all cases where statements taken by them were
challenged for constitutional violations;
"(c) Any and all cases where evidence was challenged for
constitutional violations as a result of their investigative
tactics;
"(d) Any and all cases where the court overturned the
defendant's conviction due to their investigative and
interrogation tactics; and
"(e) Any and all cases where the outcome resulted in a jury
acquitted [sic] where there was an allegation raised at trial
or during the proceeding (pre-trial or post-trial) of wrongful
investigative and interrogation tactics."
Stallworth contended in his discovery
motion that this information was relevant to bolster his claim
that his statements to those law-enforcement officers were
coerced. As the State correctly notes in its mandamus petition,
Stallworth does not raise any claim in his amended Rule 32
petition that his statements were coerced. Accordingly,
Stallworth cannot establish good cause for the disclosure of
this information. See Land, supra.
X.
The Baldwin County District Attorney also
argues that the circuit court erred in granting the following
discovery:
"All documents relating to the State's use of peremptory
challenges during Stallworth's trial, including, but not
limited to, all documents relating to any information gathered
about the jury venire persons; and
"(a) All documents relating to the use of racial criteria in
the jury selection process in criminal cases prosecuted in
Baldwin County, Alabama, including, but not limited to, charges
or racial discrimination in jury selection, grand jury
selection, and grand jury foreman selection in cases prosecuted
by the Baldwin County District Attorney and staff; and
"(b) All documents relating to any communication between the
State and any petit jury member in Stallworth's trial, before,
during, or after the trial."
It cites this Court's opinion in Ex parte
Perkins, supra, to support its assertion that documents
compiled by the district attorney during voir dire examination
are not discoverable.
In Perkins, this Court stated:
"Alabama has never specifically addressed whether a
prosecutor's notes made during voir dire examination are
likewise privileged. Our neighboring states of Florida,
Georgia, and Mississippi have addressed this issue and have
held that a prosecutor's personal notes compiled during voir
dire examination are work-product and are not discoverable by
the defense. See Patton v. State,784 So.2d 380 (Fla.2000);
Thorson v. State,721 So.2d 590 (Miss.1998); Foster v. State,258
Ga. 736, 374 S.E.2d 188 (1988). See also State v. Carter,641
S.W.2d 54 (Mo.1982). We join those jurisdictions that hold that
a prosecutor's notes compiled during jury selection are
privileged and are not subject to discovery."
920 So.2d at 607. We agree with the
district attorney, Stallworth was not entitled to the
work-product of the district attorney's office.
We have diligently examined the discovery
motion and the numerous other documents that were filed with
this mandamus petition. It is apparent that the circuit court
failed to follow the dictates of Land and subsequent cases that
address discovery in postconviction proceedings. The circuit
court failed to consider the underlying
342
issues relevant to each discovery request. The underlying
issues, the Alabama Supreme Court stated in Land, are the
primary concern when determining whether a petitioner has
established good cause for discovery. Some of the confusion may
have occurred because the discovery motion and the hearing on
the discovery motion occurred before Stallworth filed his
amended Rule 32 petition. No new discovery motion was filed
after the amended petition was submitted, nor was a new hearing
held on the discovery motion. Many of the documents requested
in the original discovery motion related to claims that were
not pursued in Stallworth's amended petition. While we
recognize that Stallworth may be entitled to some of the
requested documentation, we cannot say that Stallworth is
entitled to the broad and unfettered discovery that was granted
in this case.
This case exemplifies the problems caused
by discovery in postconviction proceedings. Since the Alabama
Supreme Court released its decision in Land, this Court has
frequently been called upon to micromanage discovery in
collateral proceedings because there is little Alabama law to
give guidance to the lower courts. We urge the Alabama Supreme
Court to adopt Rules of Court that address the "good cause"
standard as it relates to discovery in postconviction
proceedings. The federal courts have adopted similar rules. See
Rules 6(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts.
In the event that further discovery
proceedings are held in this case, we urge the trial court to
comply with the Supreme Court's decision in Land, and this
Court's decisions in Perkins, Jackson, and Hooks.
For the foregoing reasons, this petition
is due to be, and is hereby, granted. Judge Reid is directed to
vacate his order granting the broad and unlimited discovery
motion in this case. Our stay issued January 20, 2006, is
lifted.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED; STAY
LIFTED.
McMILLAN, P.J., and COBB, SHAW, and WISE,
JJ., concur.
BASCHAB, J., recuses herself.
_____________________
Footnotes:
FN1.
"A post-conviction petition is a collateral attack on a prior
criminal conviction by which a defendant can assert that a
conviction resulted from the substantial denial of his or her
constitutional rights, and the purpose of a post-conviction
proceeding is not to appeal the defendant's underlying
judgment, but rather to resolve allegations that constitutional
violations occurred at trial, when those allegations have not
been, and could not have been, adjudicated previously."
People v. Coulter,352 Ill.App.3d 151, 156,
287 Ill.Dec. 255, 260, 815 N.E.2d 899, 904 (2004).
FN2. We note that on direct appeal we
specifically addressed Stallworth's claim that his statements
were illegally admitted. We stated:
"There is more than sufficient evidence in the record
indicating that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion to suppress Stallworth's statements to
police. We must defer to the trial court's ruling on questions
involving the credibility of witnesses."
Stallworth v. State, 868 So.2d at
1150.
FN3. The State asserts that with regard to
the curriculum vitae of the State's experts all that Stallworth
need do is contact the experts. The State argues, and we agree,
that this evidence is available through other sources and
should not be the subject of a discovery order in a
postconviction proceeding. See Perkins, supra.
FN4. We note that some of this requested
discovery would be available in the record on direct
appeal.
AL
So.2d
331
proceeding the petitioner must show `good cause' for the
requested evidence. The Supreme Court stated: `[I]n order to
obtain discovery, a petitioner must allege facts that, if
proved, would entitle him to relief.' 775 So.2d at 852.
337
conducted no in camera examination of the privileged
documents."
339
the victims' death certificates, respectively;
340
during trial was consistent with the evidence allegedly linking
Stallworth to these murders."
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